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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN LABOR LAW
INTRODUCTION
This article will explore and attempt to define recent developments in
national labor law as reflected in the decisions of the National Labor Re-
lations Board and the United States courts.* The article will emphasize the
changing doctrines in the areas of principle concern under the Labor Manage-
ment Relations Act. Naturally, space and time prohibit an exhaustive analy-
sis of the decisions of the Board. The basis of selectivity has been those
cases which were felt to represent most clearly significant departures in policy
application of the LMRA. In tracing these developments, the article will be
divided in four major categories: jurisdiction of the Board, representation
proceedings, unfair labor practices, and enforcement of collective bargaining
agreements under section 301.
JURISDICTION
The most significant jurisdictional developments of last year involved
the Second Circuit's remand of an indirect flow case 1 to the Board and its
subsequent reversal by the Supreme Court, and the latter Court's decision in
three separate cases involving jurisdiction over foreign flag vessels. In addi-
tion, the NLRB, in a significant decision, adopted a new policy to be applied
to real estate operations.
Impact on Commerce Providing Statutory Jurisdiction
In NLRB v. Reliance Fuel Corp., the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit ruled that the record did not adequately prove the Board's legal
jurisdiction over a local business which sold fuel oil for home consumption.
Its gross sales exceeded $500,000 a year, and its purchases from Gulf Oil
Corporation exceeded $650,000 annually . 8 Most of the Gulf products were
refined outside of the state and delivered to storage tanks within the state.
The court doubted the applicability of the act, absent more of an impact
on commerce other than a possible disruption of indirect flow. Therefore, the
mere volume in the state of $500,000 in sales of fuel oil and related products
refined outside of the state was, not of itself, in the court's opinion, sufficient
to show a participation in commerce which could be adversely affected by a
labor dispute.
On January 7, 1963, in a per curiam opinion the Supreme Court 4 re-
versed, holding that the activities of the home fuel company affected com-
merce and were within the constitutional reach of Congress. The Court
reasoned that through the NLRA Congress has explicitly regulated not merely
transactions and goods in interstate commerce, but also those activities which,
if isolated, might be deemed local, but in the interlacing of business across
.	 * For an extensive discussion of the 1961 developments, see Comment, Labor Law's
New Frontier: The End of the Per Se Rules, 3 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 487 (1962).
1 See textual discussion following note 5 infra.
2 297 F.2d 94 (2d Cir. 1961), remanding 129 N.L.R.B. 1166 (1960).
3 The Board treated Reliance as a "retail concern." Therefore, the $500,000 amount
of gross sales met the Board's own standard for the exercise of jurisdiction.
4 83 Sup. Ct. 312 (1963).
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state lines adversely affects commerce. 5 The Court then briefly commented
that the jurisdictional test was met here in view of the fact that each pur-
chase by Reliance within the state necessarily involved the transportation of
petroleum products from outside the state. Thus its operations and the re-
lated unfair labor practices "affected commerce within the meaning of the
Act. 71
In Carol Management Corp., 6
 the Board asserted jurisdiction over a
multi-state enterprise whose primary affairs involved the ownership and
management of residential properties, including a shopping center and a
hotel. The Board's asserted jurisdiction was based on a consideration of the
totality of the diversified operations, particularly those of the shopping center
and hotel.
In this case the Board announced for the first time that it would apply
its office building standard to employers (owners, lessors, contract managers)
engaged in the operation of a shopping center. The exercise of such jurisdic-
tion would be conditioned upon a showing that the shopping center earned
$100,000 in gross revenues, of which $25,000 was derived from an organiza-
tion or store whose operation alone meets any of the Board's jurisdictional
requirements, exclusive of the indirect outflow or inflow standards. The signif-
icance of this case lies only in the fact that the Board has finally categorized
shopping center operations which of their nature affect commerce. The adop-
tion of a fixed numerical standard (i.e., $100,000; $25,000) has given cer-
tainty and stability to an area plagued with confusion.
Jurisdiction Over Foreign Flag Vessels
A trilogy of companion cases, involving the same facts, was recently
decided by the Supreme Court.' Each of these jurisdictional cases involved
an American corporation that beneficially owned certain seagoing vessels
whose legal title was registered to a foreign subsidiary of the same American
corporation.
In a 1961 representative proceeding upon the application of the National
Maritime Union, 8
 the Board found that United Fruit Company owned all of
the stock of the Empresa Hondurena de Vapores, S.A. and controlled its
board of directors and officers. In addition, it found that United Fruit, an
American corporation, operated a fleet of thirteen vessels in its regular course
of business under a time-chartered agreement with Empresa which owned
ten of the thirteen ships. Their crews were completely Honduran, and the
ships were Honduran registered. It was further found that under Honduran
law, only a union whose "Juridic Personality" is recognized by Honduras
5
 Polish Alliance v. NLRB, 322 U.S. 643, 648 (1943).
tl 137 N.L.R.B. No. 48 (1962).
7 McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 83 Sup. Ct. 671 (1963) ;
Sociedad Nacional Marineros de Honduras v. McCulloch, 201 F. Supp. 82 (D.D.C. 1962)
(suit by foreign bargaining agent to enjoin Board Members, injunction denied) ; McLeod
v. Empresa Hondurena de Vapores S.A., 200 F. Supp. 484 (S.D.N.V. 1961) (suit by foreign
owner seeking to ,enjoin election, injunction denied), rev'd sub nom. N.M.U. v. Empresa
Hondurena de Vapores S.A., 300 F.2d 222 (2d Cir. 1962) (National Maritime Union
intervened and petitioned for a writ of certiorari).
8 134 N,L.R.B. 287, 49 L.R.R.M. 2303 (1961).
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and is composed of at least ninety per cent Honduran citizens can represent
the seamen. Furthermore, Empresa was compelled to bargain exclusively
with the Honduran union, Societad, on all matters covered by the contract.
From these facts the Board concluded that United Fruit operated a
single, integrated maritime operation under which were the Empresa vessels,
recognizing both to be joint employers of the seamen sought to be covered.
It assumed jurisdiction and ordered an election. The vessels' foreign owner
sought an injunction in a federal district court which was denied.° The
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed. 1°
Citing its earlier decision in West India Fruit & S.S. Co.," the Board
concluded that the maritime operations involved more United States contacts
than foreign. It held that Empresa was engaged in "commerce" within the
meaning of section 2(6) of the ace". and that its maritime operations "af-
fected commerce" within section 2(7)." An election was ordered so that the
seamen could choose the National Maritime Union, Societad, or no union
at all.
On appeal to the Supreme Court, all parties conceded that Congress has
the constitutional powers to apply the NLRA to foreign ships while in
American waters. The Court, however, proceeded directly to the question of
whether Congress exercised these powers. The Board, in its argument, relied
principally on the test it had evolved of balancing the relative weights of the
ship's foreign as compared to American contacts." The Supreme Court,
relying heavily on the case of Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo," con-
cluded that the legislative history of the NLRA "inescapably describes the
boundaries of the act as describing only the workmen of our own country and
its possessions."" Furthermore, the Court determined that following the
"balancing of contacts test" of the Board to the ultimate might require the
Board to inquire into the internal discipline and order of all foreign vessels
calling at United States ports. The inevitable disturbance that would be
caused in maritime law and in international relations would lead to em-
barrassment in foreign affairs and be extremely impractical in practice.
The decisive question, therefore, appeared to the Court to be no more
basic than a consideration of whether the act as written was intended to have
any application to foreign registered vessels employing foreign seamen. And
as in Benz, the NLRB was unable to point to any specific language in the
act itself or in its legislative history that would reflect a Congressional intent
to give the act such coverage.
9 200 F. Supp. 484 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
" 300 F.2d 222 (2d Cir. 1962).
11 130 N.L.R.B. 343, 47 L.R.R.M. 1269 (1961).
12 61 Stat. 137 (1947), 29 U.S.C, § 152(6) (1958) defines "commerce" to mean
"trade, traffic, commerce, transportation or communication among the several States...."
13 61 Stat. 137 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 152(7) (1958) provides:
The term 'affecting commerce' means in commerce, or burdening or obstructing
commerce or the free flow of commerce, or having led or tending to lead to a
labor dispute burdening or obstructing commerce or the free flow of commerce.
11 Where a contrary result in the balancing test is reached, the Board has concluded
that the act is inapplicable. E. G. Dalzell Towing Co., 137 N.L.R.B. No. 48, .50 L.R.R.M.
1164 (1962).
" 353 U.S. 138 (1957).
Id. at 144.
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With such an absence of clear Congressional intent, which must be shown
affirmatively in the delicate field of international relations, the Board was
held to be without jurisdiction. The requirement of clear intent was based
on an appreciation of the international problems involved in applying the
sanction of the act to a foreign flag. The Court had to be particularly con-
scious of the latter situation since any determination would result in the
regulation of the internal order of the ship. It, therefore, was quick to indi-
cate that its conclusion does not foreclose such a practice in different contexts,
e.g., the Jones Act,'T where the problem of internal regulation may not be
present.' 8
REPRESENTATION PROCEEDING
Qualification for Representation
The Board has recently reaffirmed its position that as long as a labor
union meets the statutory requirements, the Board is bound to process its
petition. In Alto Plastic's Mfg. Corp.,19
 the Board held that it is without
authority to withhold its process from a petitioner seeking an election if the
petitioner qualifies as a labor organization under section 2(5)." This is true
even though the union may be an "ineffectual representative, even though its
contracts do not secure the same gains as other employees in the area, even
though certain of its officers have criminal records or there are betrayals of
trust and confidences, or that funds are missing." However, the Board did
caution that it would revoke the certificate in the event the union becomes
nothing more than a sham or paper union.
Contract as a Bar to Election
In the Boston Gas Co. case,21 the Board took occasion to redefine the
purpose of the contract bar rule. The Board explained that it is designed to
deal with situations involving questions concerning representation and is not
applicable to proceedings for clarification or amendment of outstanding
certifications.
In a further development on the contract bar rule, a majority of the
Board in Paragon Prods. Corp.22 revised the rule as previously defined and
followed since the Keystone case in 195823 The net effect of the interpreta-
tion as established in Keystone was to require a presumption of illegality with
respect to any contract containing a union security clause which did not ex-
pressly reflect the precise language of the statute. But the Supreme Court
17 4i Stat. 1007 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1958).
18 McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, supra note 7, at 678.
19 136 N.L.R.B. No. 70, 49 L.R.R.M. 1867 (1962).
20 Section 2(5) sets forth two requirements:
1) Employees must participate in the organization.
2) That the organization exists for the purpose in whole or in part of dealing
with employers concerning wages, hours and other terms and conditions.
21 130 N.L.R.B. 1230, 47 L.R.R.M. 1429 (1961).
22 134 N.L.R.B. 662, 49 L.R.R.M. 1160 (1961).
23 Keystone Coat, Apron & Towel Supply Co., 121 N.L.R.B. 880, 42 L.R.R.M. 1456
(1958).
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had sharply curtailed the area in which the provisions of a contract will be
presumed illegal '24 thus causing the Board to modify its position.
The Board therefore ruled that only a dearly unlawful union security
provision in a contract will be sufficient to render that contract no bar re-
gardless of whether it has ever been or was ever intended to be enforced by
the parties 2 6 Should the union security provisions be ambiguous and not
clearly unlawful, such will not affect the contract as a bar in the absence of a
Board or court determination of illegality as to the particular provision.
However, the strong position assumed by the Board in regard to clearly
unlawful union security provisions was not adopted in relation to illegal "hot
cargo agreements." In the precedent case of Food Haulers, Inc.," a panel
majority over-ruled the contract bar policy of the Pilgrim Furniture case,"
where the Board held that a contract containing a "hot cargo" clause out-
lawed by Section 8(e) of the LMRA would not bar an election.
The new policy is that such a "hot cargo" agreement although unlawful
will not affect a contract's validity as a bar to an election. The rationale of
the Board's decision was that the agreement does not act as a restraint upon
an employee's choice of a bargaining representative or upon any other ob-
jective of contract bar rules. Setting aside an entire contract as an election
bar on finding an unlawful "hot cargo" clause constitutes a more drastic
sanction in a representation proceeding than is permitted by statute in an
unfair labor practice proceeding. Thus a "hot cargo" provision is carefully
distinguished from an illegal security provision which by its nature denies
freedom of choice and determination to an employee.
Termination of Representation Proceedings
Leonard Wholesale Meats, Inc.28 revised a previous Board ruling so
that any petition will be considered premature if it is filed more than ninety
days (instead of 150) before the terminal date of a subsisting contract. The
decision in no way modifies the length of the insulated period which remains
at sixty days. This reduction was apparently considered to be necessary in
view of the considerable decrease in the elapsed time between the filing of
the petition and elections resulting in the choice of a unit representative.
24 NLRB v. News Syndicate Co., 365 U.S. 695 (1961). The Supreme Court ruled
that it would not assume that unions and employers would violate a federal law. Unless
there are provisions that specifically call for illegal activity, a contract cannot be held
illegal because it fails affirmatively to disclaim all illegal objectives.
25 Such clearly unlawful provisions would include:
1) Those that expressly or unambiguously require an employer to give a union
member preference in hiring, laying off, etc.
2) Those that specifically withhold from non-members or new employees the
statutory 30-day grace period.
3) Those that require as a condition of employment payment of sums other
than dues or initiation fees.
20 136 N.L.R.B. No. 36, 49 L.R.R.M. 1774 (1962).
27 128 N.1,12.13. 910, 46 L.R.R.M. 1427 (1960).
28 136 N.L.R.B. No. 103, 49 L.R.R.M. 1901 (1962).
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Severance from an Established Unit
In Kalamazoo Paper Box Corp.,29
 a panel majority overturned the ap-
proach adopted in recent cases in ascertaining whether severance from an
established unit should be accorded to a subgroup of employee truckdrivers.
That approach had for the most part not required an affirmative showing in
each case that the interests of the group seeking severance be substantially
different from those of other employees in the established units. The net
result, in effect, had been a granting of severance to truckdrivers automati-
cally whenever requested. 3°
The majority will now allow severance only when the petitioning em-
ployees in reality constitute a functionally distinct group and, as a group,
have overriding special interests. The Board will henceforth base each de-
termination on the particular facts before it rather than on a consideration of
title, tradition or practice, which do not, of themselves, establish that separate
special interests exist. Therefore, the Board has reversed the cycle and
returned to its earlier position of weighing the special interests of the group
with the community of interest shared with other employees.'t The chief
interests to be considered include wages, base of pay, hours of work, super-
vision, seniority and benefits. When the community of interest is predomin-
ant, the Board will now deny severance.
Employer Interference with Election
Two recent cases indicate that pre-election statements made by an em-
ployer or his supervisors are coming into closer scrutiny by the Board, as it
changes the former "threat or prediction test." 32
In the case of Baynes Stellite Corp., 3
 a panel majority held that a high
ranking supervisor's pre-election statement, "We have been told (by cus-
tomers) that we would not continue to be the sole source of supply if we be-
come unionized due to the possibility of a work stoppage because of strikes
or walkouts," constituted substantial interference with the election. The
Board found that in fact only one customer had informed the company that
it would seek other sources of supply. This material misrepresentation in the
circumstances of a vigorous anti-union campaign was enough to set the elec-
tion aside. The Board implied that had the statement been true, the employer
would have been within his legal rights in making it,
The Board found cause to have an election set aside in Trane Co.34
where the employer made certain statements under the guise of explaining
his legal rights, which, inter alia, included: "Do you want to gamble away
all these things?" (present benefits); that the employer would bargain on a
29 136 N.L.R.B. No. 10, 49 L.R.R.M. 1715 (1962).
39 Long-Lewis Hardware Co., 134 N,L.R.B. 1554, 49 L.R.R.M. 1375 (1961).
31
 May Dep't Stores, Co., 85 N.L.R.B. 550, 24 L.R,R.M. 1436 (1949).
32
 The Board had previously drawn a line between statements which constituted
"threat of reprisals" and those which were "predictions." An employer could say that he
would be unable to pay the union scale, and if the union came in, he would have to
move the plant. Chicopee Mfg. Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 106, 33 L.R.R.M. 1064 (1953). This
distinction has now apparently lost its significance.
33 136 N.L.R.B. No. 3, 49 L.R.R.M. 1711 (1962).
34 137 N.L.R.B. No. 165, 50 L.R.R.M. 1434 (1962).
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"cold blooded business basis"; and "the employees might come out with a
lot less than they have now."
The Board found the former "threat or prediction" test to be too
mechanical. In the future, the Board suggested, the surrounding circum-
stances and the economic realities of the particular employer-employee rela-
tionship will be determinative, rather than the application of a mere label to
the employer's speech. The Board is becoming more conscious than before
in creating and maintaining laboratory type conditions for the conduct of
the election.
A new cause to set aside election results, that of racial appeals, has
found limited acceptance with the Board. In the Sewell Mfg. case,"5 the
Board ruled that under certain circumstances, racial appeals will provide
grounds for setting aside an election. However, the majority established
certain narrow limits within which such an appeal would be sufficient: (a) If
the party making the appeal dishonestly and inaccurately represents the other
party's position on racial matters, and/or does so in an inflammatory manner;
(b) if the appeal to racial prejudice is on matters unrelated to the election
issues or the union's activities.
Just prior to the election in Sewell, the employer distributed among all
of his employees a photograph showing James Carey, President of the I.U.E.,
dancing with a Negro woman. Also, there was included a letter signed by
Carey and Walter Ruether praising the freedom riders. In setting aside the
election, the Board found that such propaganda had no relation to any issue
in the election but was designed solely to excite racial feelings.
As indicated, this area is relatively new. However, the Board has recog-
nized that racial prejudice is a powerful emotional force, not calculated to
encourage reasoning. When such an appeal is made, the burden of proof
is on the party making the appeal to establish that it was truthful and
germane. But when there is a doubt as to whether the total conduct of the
party was within the described bounds, the doubt will be resolved against him.
UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
Interference with Organizational Activity
In May Dep't Stores Co." the Board breathed new life into the ap-
parently discredited Bonwit Teller doctrine" by holding that an employer's
refusal to grant a union equal time during working hours for the purpose of
replying to pre-election speeches made by the employer violates section
8(a) (1) of the act. The Board found no basis for the contention that Living-
ston Shirt38 "overruled the Bonwit Teller doctrine as it applies to department
stores. . . ."" Moreover, the Board felt that nothing in the Nutone4° case
35 138 N.L.R.B. No. 12, 50 L.R.R.M. 1532 (1962).
36 136 N.L.R.B. No. 71, 49 L.R.R.M. 1862 (1962).
37 "It requires little analysis to perceive that Bonwit Teller was the discredited
Clark Bros. doctrine in scant disguise, It is equally contrary to the statute and congres-
sional purpose." Livingston Shirt Corp., 107 N.L.R.B. 400, 407, 33 L.R.R.M. 1156, 1158
(1953).
38 Supra note 37.
39 49 L.R.R.M. at 1863. Compare the language quoted from Livingston Shirt,
supra note 37.
44) NLRB v. United Steelworkers of America (Nutone), 357 U.S. 357 (1958). In
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prohibited the result reached. Members Rodgers and Leedom dissented es-
sentially on the ground that Nutone would prohibit the finding of an unfair
labor practice in the absence of a factual showing of substantial diminution
of the union's ability to organize employees. Their point would seem to be
well taken since the majority made no analysis of the facts to substantiate its
conclusion that the union's organizational ability was in fact substantially
diminished.
In the absence of such a factual analysis, the result reached takes on the
appearance of a per se rule, with all the attendant difficulties such rules have
encountered in the courts.'"
Superseniority
In Swarco Inc v. NLRB 42
 the Sixth Circuit upheld the Board's position
that granting of superseniority to economic strikers who would return to
work, though motivated by an honest desire to continue plant operations,
violates sections 8(a) (1) and (3). Particularly significant is the fact that
the trial examiner's finding as to the employer's good faith was not questioned
by the Board.
Within eight days of the Swarco decision, the Third Circuit; in Erie
Resistor Corp. v. NLRB, 43 decided that the adoption of preferential seniority
to assure tenure to replacements is proper if the employer is motivated solely
by necessity to protect and continue his business. This disagreement among
the circuits seems destined for resolution since the Supreme Court granted
certiorari in the Erie case.44
Employer's Right to Subcontract, Lockout and Discontinue Operations
1. Subcontracting
In Town & Country Mfg. Co.45 the Board held that an employer's uni-
lateral decision to subcontract work, previously performed by members of the
bargaining unit, violates section 8(a) (5) regardless of the motivation behind
such decision. Thus the decision to subcontract work is now a mandatory
subject of collective bargaining. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp.," which
made the employer's motivation the deciding factor in determining whether
a refusal to bargain in good faith had occurred, is thereby overruled.
On the precise facts of Town & Country, an overruling of Fibreboard
Nutone the General Counsel argued that an otherwise valid no solicitation rule, when
coupled with employer anti-union solicitation, constitutes an unfair labor practice. "For
us to lay down such a rule of law would show indifference to the responsibilities imposed
by the Act primarily on the Board to appraise carefully the interests of both sides of
any labor-management controversy in the diverse circumstances of particular cases and
in light of the Board's special understanding of these industrial situations." Id. at 362-63.
41 See Comment, Labor Law's New Frontier: The End of the Per Se Rules, 3 B.C.
Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 487, 513 (1962).
42 303 F.2d 668 (6th Cir. 1962).
43 303 F.2d 359 (3d Cir.), cert. granted, 83 Sup. Ct. 48 (1962). For extended dis-
cussion of the Board's position and the difficulties it has encountered in the courts, see
Note, 4 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 438 (1963) ; Comment, supra note 41.
44 Supra note 43.
45 136 N.L.R.B. No. 111, 49 L.R.R.M. 1918 (1962).
4 '5 130 N.L.R.B. 1558, 47 L.R.R.M. 1547 (1961).
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is not necessary since the employer's decision was in fact discriminatively
rather than economically motivated. The motivation behind such a decision
may, however, still be relevant for purposes of fashioning a remedy. Signifi-
cantly, the Board, in ordering reinstatement of the replaced employees and
compulsory termination of the subcontract, based this action on the 8(a) (3)
(discrimination) violation rather than 8 (a) (5) (refusal to bargain).
Member Rodgers was unwilling to overrule Fibreboard. Moreover, he
dissented to the majority's finding that the employer had in fact discrimi-
nated. Since he viewed the decision to subcontract as being economically
motivated, he found no refusal to bargain.
Two subsequent cases give impetus to the idea that the severe remedy
given in Town & Country will be used where discrimination does in fact
occur. In Renton News Record,'" a group of employers jointly purchased a
"Goss Press" which greatly increased the speed and efficiency of composing
room operations and greatly reduced the need for composing room employees.
When this change of operations was effectuated, excess employees were dis-
charged. The Board, relying on Town & Country, found that a unilateral
decision to automate constitutes a refusal to bargain. In this respect, there is
no difference between a unilateral decision respecting subcontracting and
one respecting automation.
However, there was an express finding that the employers were not dis-
criminating and, therefore, did not violate 8(a) (3). The employer was
ordered to bargain with the union about composing room conditions but was
not required to reinstate the discharged employees. The Board's reasoning
was that reinstatement would adversely affect employers who were not parties
to the proceeding and that such relief would be punitive, not remedial. In
respect to this latter point, it would seem significant that the Board expressly
noted that the employers "were faced with the choice of either changing their
method of operations . . . or being forced to go out of business." The con-
clusion seems virtually irresistable that the remedial aspect of the case rested
on the finding that the discharges were not discriminatively motivated.
Hawaii Meat Co.48 gives further credence to this conclusion. Here, the
employer, after his employees had engaged in an economic strike, unilaterally
decided to subcontract the work which had been performed by these striking
employees. Upon the strikers' unconditional offer to return to work, they
were informed that they no longer had jobs to return to. Applying Town &
Country, the Board held that the decision to subcontract had turned the eco-
nomic strike into an unfair labor practice strike. Accordingly, the refusal to
take back the employees constituted a violation of 8(a) (3). Reinstatement
was ordered, and the employer was ordered to bargain with the union about
his decision to subcontract.
That the duty to bargain under Town & Country may be quite easily satis-
fied was perhaps indicated in Weingarten Food Center, Inc." This case in-
volved an employer's decision to sell five out of six retail outlets. He did not
bargain on this decision, but he did notify the union of his plan to grant
47 136 N.L.R.B. No. 55, 49 L,R.R.M. 1972 (1962).
48 139 N.L.R.B. No. 75, 51 L.R.R.M. 1430 (1962).
4° 140 N.L.R.B. No. 67, 52 L,R.R.M. 1001 (1962).
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severance pay to those employees who were not to be rehired at the remaining
store. He also asked for union assistance in deciding which employees should
be retained. The 8(a) (5) complaint was dismissed. Member Rodgers relied
on his dissent in Town & Country. Member Fanning felt that Weingarten
was an improper case in which to apply Town & Country, since the General
Counsel had not taken exception to the trial examiner's ruling that there had
been no 8(a) (5) violation. Member Brown dissented on the ground that
Town & Country would require a finding of an 8(a) (5) violation.
The subcontracting issue has also been before the federal courts under
Section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act." For instance, in Webster Elec. 51 the
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that an employer who uni-
laterally subcontracted janitorial services, previously performed by bargain-
ing unit employees, violated the union shop clause in the collective bargaining
agreement. There was no express clause covering subcontracting, but the
court found the employer's action to be inconsistent with the basic purpose
of a union shop.
2. Discontinuance of Operations
In Darlington Mfg. Co.,52
 it was held that an employer who completely
shuts down operations after a union election victory, where he is at least
partially motivated by animosity towards the union, violates section 8(a) (3).
The employer vigorously contended that it had an absolute right to stop
doing business, regardless of its motivation for such a decision. Recognizing
that the issue had never before been directly decided, the Board found that
section 8(a)(3) constituted a qualification on the right to stop doing busi-
ness. The stark rigidity of this proposition may be qualified by the Board's
finding that Darlington was but one link in a chain of corporate entities which
included several other plant facilities. Viewed in this light, the facts do not
strictly support the conclusion that Darlington went out of business, but the
language of the opinion is clearly sufficient to indicate that the case was decided
on that basis."
The Board ordered back pay for approximately 500 affected employees,
to continue until such time as they are able to obtain "substantially equiva-
lent" employment. In addition, the remaining plants in the corporate chain
were ordered to bargain with the union about the preparation of preferential
hiring lists, on which the names of affected employees would be placed. Of
course, section 8(a) (5) was also violated but the Board made it clear
throughout the opinion that the back pay award was given to rectify the
8 (a) (3 ) violation.
An employer, for valid economic reasons, decided to transfer the site of
his plant facilities. However, he was found to have accelerated the transfer
110
 61 Stat. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C, § 185 (1958).
51
 UAW, Local 391 v. Webster Elec. Co., 299 F.2d 195 (7th Cir. 1962).
52
 139 N.L.R.B. No. 23, 51 L.R.R.M. 1278 (1962). This case is analyzed from both
management and union points of view, in Comment, supra p. 581.
53
 But see Star Baby Co., 140 N.L.R.B. No. 67, 52 L.R.R.M. 1094 (1963), where the
employer, for reasons similar to those in Darlington, completely shut down his opera-
tions. However, unlike Darlington, the company was not found to be part of a corporate
chain. Nevertheless, the Board ordered the same kind of relief as in Darlington.
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by one month because of union animosity. Accordingly, in Ox-Wall Prods.
.11/11g. Co.54
 he was ordered to pay one month's back pay to affected em-
ployees. Since the case was decided before Town & Country, the unilateral
nature of his decision to transfer was not discussed."
NLRB v. Preston Feed Co." is another acceleration decision of interest.
Here, the employer had been planning to suspend its trucking department
and subcontract the work to an affiliated company, this latter point, unlike
Darlington, being given no attention by the court. With a heavy turnover
in truck drivers (and such being legitimate business justification), the only
point undecided was the date at which the operations would be suspended.
With the advent of a union, however, it was immediately suspended. While
the Third Circuit agreed with the Board that the acceleration was an unfair
labor practice, it did feel that the Board's order to resume operations was
not to be construed as precluding future suspension provided that economic
justification existed. But with the justification already present, the question
unanswered by the court was just how long the employer must wait before
it could properly dose down its department.
Unlike Ox-Wall there was conflicting evidence as to when the final
decision was made — before or after the union notice. The Board resolved
this conflict against the employer, thus rejecting the contention that the
employer had already decided to close two days later. The Ox-Wall relief is
therefore unavailable. The presence of the original economic justification
(i.e., turnover of drivers) would tend to eliminate a Darlington-type relief
requiring the affiliate to employ the discharged employees.
In effect, Preston is a hybrid of Darlington and the type of cases in
which the advent of the union is considered an additional expense, one part
of the overall economic decision to close. 57 This latter situation has never
been accepted by the Board." It has consistently held that hostility to union
wages is hostility to unions." The Preston case could be interpreted as one
circuit court finally agreeing with this position. However, its hybrid charac-
ter (i.e., the union was not considered as a cost or economic factor itself)
would tend to discourage such a conclusion.
64 135 N.L.R.B. 840, 49 L.R.R.M. 1585, enforced, 51 L.R.R.M. 2595 (2d Cir. 1962).
5 * A similar result was reached in Myers Ceramic Prods., 140 N.L.R.B. No. 33, 51
L.R.R.M. 1605 (1962).
56 309 F.2d 346 (4th Cir. 1962).
57 NLRB v. J. M. Lassing, 284 F.2d 781 (6th Cir. 1960) (union considered as a cost,
not as a union). See also NLRB v. New England Web, Inc., 51 L.R.R.M. 2426 (1st Cir.
1962). (In view of the precarious financial position of the company, the unionization
was a legitimate economic factor) and NLRB v. Houston Chronicle Publishing Co., 211
F.2d 848 (5th Cir. 1954). (The issue is whether there were bona fide business reasons, not
whether motives were sound or unsound). These cases are discussed in the Comment re-
ferred to in note 52 supra.
58 Meyers Ceramic Prods., supra note 55.
59 NLRB v. Barbers Iron Foundry, 126 N.L.R.B. 30, 45 L.R.R.M. 1283 (1960) ; NLRB
v. R. C. Mahon Co., 118 N.L.R.11, 1537, 40 L.R.R.M. 1417 (1957) ; NLRB v. Missouri
Transit Co., 116 N.L.R.B. 587, 38 L.R.R.M. 1301 (1956) ; NLRB v. Wallich & Schwalm
Co., 95 N.L.R.B. 1265, 28 L.R.R.M. 1438 (1951) ; NLRB v. Rome Prods. Co., 77
N.L.R.B. 1217, 22 L.R.R.M. 1138 (1948).
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3. Lockout
In Brawn Food Store" all members of a multi-employer bargaining unit
were locked out and temporarily replaced in response to a union strike at one
employer's premises. This constituted a violation of 8(a) (3), the response
not being within the rule of Buffalo Linen" which protects a lockout when it
can be viewed as a "defensive measure to protect the solidarity of the multi-
employer unit."62 When the non-struck employers replaced their employees
and continued to operate, their action was not "defensive" but "retaliatory." 63
In other words, the entire bargaining unit may lock out its employees, but
only the struck employer may continue operations with replacements."
It should be obvious to the reader that the Town & Country and Dar-
lington decisions are but two sides of the same coin. They represent the
general trend of Board decisions to restrict unilateral action by employers.
The "management prerogative" area is being slowly but surely whittled
away.65
Informational Picketing
1. 8(6)(4)
In Teamsters, Local 760 v. NLRB," the union conducted a consumer
boycott against the employer's products in addition to a general strike which
was in progress. Pickets were placed at retail stores urging the public to
refrain from purchasing the primary employer's non-union products. Em-
ployees of the primary employer were informed that the picketing was for the
purpose of enlisting public sympathy. No work stoppages resulted. The
Board found this to be a violation of section 8(b) (4) (ii) (B), documenting
its per se interpretation with the legal history of clause (ii) and a literal reading
of the proviso to 8(b) (4) which exempts only "publicity, other than
picketing."
The circuit court observed, however, that the problem of free speech
cannot be ignored in this area. Thus the court felt that in the absence of a
substantial economic impact, it would have a difficult time finding constitu-
tional justification for the prohibition of peaceful, non-coercive picketing
addressed solely to consumers. In effect, this court places picketing within
the "publicity" proviso, though the language expressly excludes it."
2. 8(b)(7)
It was decided in Irvins, Inc." that, for purposes of 8(b) (7) (B), a valid
election is "conducted" on the date the election results are certified by the
60 137 N.L.R.B. No. 6, 50 L.R.R.M. 1046 (1962).
61 NLRB v. Truckdrivers Local 449, 353 U.S. 87 (1957).
62
 50 L.R.R.M. at 1047.
63 Id. at 1048.
64 The right to replace economic strikers is, of course, guaranteed. NLRB v. Mackay
Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938).
65 For an analysis of the cases leading to these important decisions, see the Comment
referred to in note 52 supra,
66 308 F.2d 311 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
67 For an analysis of Local 760 and a criticism of the result reached, see Desmond,
Consumer Picketing: The Limited Restrictions of the Labor Management Relations Act,
4 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 79 (1962).
68 134 N.L.R.B. 686, 49 L.R.R,M. 1188 (1961).
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Board. Accordingly, there can be no basis for an alleged violation of that
section until the results are certified, and recognition or organizational
picketing may continue up to that time. Similarly, the twelve month period,
within which picketing for recognition is unlawful, begins to run from the date
of certification. However, for remedial purposes, under section 8(b) (7) (B),
the Board will require cessation of all post election picketing for twelve months
from the date on which the union terminates its picketing, either voluntarily or
involuntarily by court injunction.
In Woodward Motors Inc.? the union placed two signs in a snowbank
abutting the employer's premises after it had lost an election, and the results
had been certified. One sign read: "We Are Not Picketing for Organization ,
or Recognition." The other stated that "The Employees of Woodward
Motors Inc. Are Not Protected by a Union Contract." Two union agents
were stationed in a nearby auto to insure that nothing happened to the signs.
This was held to be recognition or organizational picketing within the mean-
ing of 8(b) (7) (B), the Board making it clear that the publicity proviso of
8(b) (7) (C) is to be read as a self-contained unit [i.e., applying only to
(C) b without reference to the rest of 8 (b) (7). This view was reinforced
in Janel Sales Corp."
In other words, 8(b) (7) (C) is not to be read as a direct qualification
to 8(b) (7), as a whole, but merely as a statement of a separate but related
rule. Under the doctrine of the above two cases, the proviso of subparagraph
(C) is not available to a union as a defense to an alleged violation of sub-
paragraph (A).
The Board was presented with another 8(b)( 7) (C) situation in the
.Barker Bros. Corp. case,7' in a slightly different context, however. There,
during normal store hours the union picketed an employer's retail outlets at
the customers' entrances with signs stating that the stores were non-union
and asking that the public cease doing business therein. The union took
elaborate steps to advise the public and other unions that the picketing was
purely informational. Nonetheless, over a three month period there were
three instances of delivery stoppages and several minor delays. During this
time picketing occurred at approximately eighteen stores.
The majority, holding this to be protected by 8(b) (7) (C), reasoned
that the publicity proviso protects publicity picketing except where an
"effect" thereof "is to induce any individual employed by any other person in
the course of his employment, not to pick up, deliver or transport any goods
or not to perform any services." 72 If read literally, these words would clearly
prohibit the activity here involved. This was the basis of the dissent by mem-
bers Rodgers and Leedom. The majority took what might be called a "rule of
reason" approach and would not apply the words literally. What constitutes
an "effect" under the statute depends on whether the employer's business has
been disrupted or curtailed. It is apparent that a quantitative test which
concerns itself solely with the number of deliveries not made or services not
69 135 N.L.R.B. No. 90, 49 L.R.R.M. 1576 (1962).
70 136 N.L.R.S. No. 143, 50 L.R.R.M. 1033 (1962).
71 136 N.L.R.B. No. 54, 51 L.R.R.M. 1053 (1962).
72 Section 8(b) (7) (C) was added by § 704(c) of the LMRDA, Pub. L. 86-257, 73
Stat. 519 (1959).
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performed, is, in the majority's opinion, an inadequate yardstick for deter-
mining whether to remove informational picketing from the proviso's pro-
tection. The test, as framed by the majority, is described in terms of actual
impact on the employer's business. Whether such picketing is unlawful
under 8(b) (7) (C) is a question of fact to be resolved in light of all the
circumstances of the case. 73
In view of the Board's holding in the Barker case and in the previously
mentioned Teamsters decision, it is apparent that the Board intends to
measure the lawfulness of 8(b) (4) and 8(b) (7) informational picketing in
terms of its economic effect on the employer's business. This will necessitate
some affirmative showing of substantial interference or curtailment.
Union Control of Seniority
A question of unfair representation by an union arose in Miranda Fuel
C0.74
 The case involved a business in which a seasonal slack existed from
April 15 to October 15 during which time many employees were laid off. The
collective bargaining agreement provided that the layoff should be according
to seniority. Those employees with insufficient seniority to withstand the
layoff could obtain a leave of absence for the duration of the slack season.
If they reported to the shop steward on the morning of October 15, their
seniority status would be unaffected by the leave of absence, but any man
who failed to report on the specified day forfeited all seniority rights under
the agreement. Lopuch, an employee, for personal reasons applied for and
received a leave of absence commencing on April 12. Because of illness he
was prevented from reporting until the 30th. At the union's insistence,
Lopuch was dropped to the bottom of the seniority list. Initially, the union
based its request on the fact that Lopuch had returned late, but, upon learn-
ing of his illness, the reason later given was Lopuch's early departure.
Lopuch's seniority status was such that he would have been entitled to work
during the entire slack season.
The Board, in a supplemental decision," held that section 8(h) (1) (A)
"prohibits labor organizations when acting in a statutory representative capac-
ity, from taking action against any employee upon considerations or classifi-
cations which are irrelevant, invidious, or unfair." 7° It stated that unions
are under a greater duty than employers with respect to members of the
bargaining unit. Moreover, the union and employer violate sections 8(b) (2)
73
 For an extended analysis of 8(b) (7) cases, see Comment supra note 41, at 605.
74 140 N.L.R.B. No. 7, 51 L.R.R.M. 1584 (1962).
73 Originally, the Board had decided that the collective bargaining agreement violated
sections 8(a) (1) and (3) . and 8(b)(1) and (2) of the act because it gave com-
plete control of seniority status to the union, 125 N.L.R.B. 454, 45 L.R.R.M. 1122
(1959). On appeal the Second Circuit held that the union did not have complete
control over seniority and the action taken against Lopuch was unauthorized and "con-
stituted a delegation of power over seniority rights which improperly encouraged union
membership and discriminated against employee Lopuch," NLRB v. Miranda Fuel Co.,
284 F.2d 861 (2d Cir. 1960). Certiorari was granted (June 5, 1961) and the case was
remanded to the Board for consideration in the light of Local 357 v. NLRB, 365 U.S.
667 (1960), decided in the interim. Local 357 decided that a union hiring hall was not
per se unlawful under 8(a) (3).
76 51 L.R.R.M. at 1587.
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and 8(a) (3) respectively when the union causes the employment status of an
employee to be derogated upon the basis of an unfair classification. Chairman
McCulloch and member Fanning dissented essentially on the ground that the
union's action, without an additional factual showing of unlawful motivation,
did not amount to arbitrary and invidious discrimination in violation of its
duty to represent fairly all members. Furthermore, they felt that the proper
remedy for such a violation would be revocation of certification." The case
does in fact decide for the first time that failure to represent fairly gives rise
to an unfair labor practice.
ENFORCEMENT OF COLLECTIVE AGREEMENTS UNDER SECTION 301
The Supreme Court in Smith v. Evening News Ass'n 78 held that section
301 (a) 79 gives courts, both federal and state, jurisdiction to allow an em-
ployee as an individual and as assignee for forty others to bring an action
for damages for breach of a collective bargaining contract even though the
alleged conduct resulting in the breach was an unfair labor practice within
the act. It premised its decision on the proposition that while the authority
of the Board to deal with unfair labor practices which also violate a collec-
tive bargaining agreement is not displaced by section 301, it is not exclusive
and does not destroy the jurisdiction of the courts in a 301 situation.
The Court then proceeded to refute the concept that all suits to vindicate
individual rights arising from a collective bargaining contract should be ex-
cluded from the coverage of section 301. In so doing, the Court cited de-
cisions which did allow suits under section 301 to obtain specific performance
of an arbitration award ordering reinstatement and back pay to individual
employees,s9 to recover wage increases in a contest over the validity of a
collective bargaining contract, 81 and suits against individual union men for
violation of a no strike clause. 82
The rights of individual employees concerning rates of pay and condi-
tions of employment, the Court stated, are a major focus of negotiation of
collective bargaining contracts. Individual claims lay at the heart of the
grievance and arbitration proceeding. Thus the exclusion of these claims
from the scope of section 301 would stultify the Congressional policy of
having the administration of collective bargaining contracts accomplished
under a uniform federal law.
The Court, therefore, ruled that the Westinghouse cases3 is no longer
77 For cases where revocation of certification was deemed to be the appropriate
remedy, see Hughes Tool Co., 104 N.L.R.B. 318, 32 L.R.R.M. 1010 (1953) ; Laurus &
Brother, 62 N.L.R.B. 1075, 16 L.R.R.M. 242 (1945).
78 371 U.S. 195 (1962). Certiorari was granted after the Michigan Supreme Court
affirmed dismissal on jurisdictional grounds. 362 Mich. 350, 106 N.W.2d 785 (1961).
79 61 Stat. 157 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1958).
99 United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593
(1960).
81 Charles Dowd Box CO. V. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502 (1962).
82 Atkinson v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 370 U.S. 238 (1962).
83 Association of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.,
348 U.S. 437 (1955). Suit was brought to enforce the right of employees to wages which
were due. The Court dismissed on the grounds that it believed the absence of any provi-
sion in § 301(a) to enforce the individual's rights under Federal law precluded jurisdiction.
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controlling. Any individual in a section 301 proceeding may enforce em-
ployees' rights under the collective bargaining agreement. The courts, in
turn, may entertain such a suit, irrespective of the labor policy questions
involved, and the courts may resolve these questions on their own 89
The Supreme Court had occasion in Drake Bakeries, Inc. v. Bakery
Workers, Local 5085
 to render a decision involving a section 301 suit for the
second time in 1962.
The initial dispute resulted from a union-management disagreement as
to certain days on which the plant should be operated. The union, it was
charged, instigated a strike making it impossible to resume production on
the day involved.
In the district court action for damages, the union successfully moved
that the suit be stayed, pending arbitration of the dispute in accordance with
the terms of the contracts° It further denied by affidavit that it instigated
the strike or encouraged its members not to work on the day in question.
The court of appeals reversed.87
The Supreme Court found the language of the contract sufficiently broad
to obligate the employer to arbitrate claims for damages for forbidden
strikes. This the Court found to be especially binding on the employer in
view of the union denial of responsibility. And it was on the same broad
contract language that the Court was able to distinguish this arbitrable
argument from that in the Atkinson case where claims or complaints of the
employer were expressly excluded. 88
The Court in its opinion stressed the Congressional policy underlying
section 301 in providing for the enforcement of a collective bargaining con-
tract, the purpose being to place "sanctions behind agreements to arbitrate
grievance disputes, preferring final adjustment by a voluntary method of
the parties." .
For this reason, the Court declined to enforce merely the no-strike clause
which it could do if it refused a stay in the suit for damages in the district
court. Instead, it enforced both the no-strike clause and the agreement to
arbitrate by granting a stay until the claim for damages was arbitrated. By
so doing, the Court concluded, it would merely be remitting the company to
the forum of its own choice, and would in no way deny to it the damages to
which it may be entitled."
The significance of this decision lies not in the apparent binding effect
84 371 U.S. at 298. For a full discussion of Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, see case
note p. 766 infra.
85 370 U.S. 254 (1962).
86 196 F. Supp. 148 (S.D.N.Y. 1960). The contract provided for compulsory, final
and binding arbitration, at the request of either of "all complaints, disputes or grievances
arising between them involving questions of interpretation or application of any clause or
matter covered by this contract or any act or conduct or relation between the parties
hereto, directly or indirectly," 370 U.S. at 257, n.2.
87 287 F.2d 155 (2d Cir. 1961).
88 Supra note 82. The Court relied on its reasoning in a prior case that "arbitration
is a matter of contract and a party cannot be required to submit to arbitration any dis-
pute be has not agreed to submit." United Steelworkers v. Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574,
582 (1960).
86
 Drake Bakeries v. Bakery Workers, Local 50, supra note 85, at 263.
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of the arbitration clause but in the difficulty the Court had in reaching its
decision. It limited the decision to the specific language of the clause and the
specific union activity involved. It would seem that it will take persuasive
evidence for a union to establish from the language of the agreement that the
employer intended to forego his rights under section 301, regarding alleged
violations of the agreement, particularly in view of the fact that a court
cannot be considered a less competent adjudicator than an arbitrator.
BRIAN J. MORAN
MICHAEL B. SPITZ •
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